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Abstract: Exploiting new data from a survey and behavioral experiment 
conducted in Peru we analyze individuals’ preferences for securing income in old 
age. We identify a group that is unrationed by the mandate to save in Peru’s 
pension system, and draw insights from their affiliation and contribution behavior. 
Among the unrationed, those who are more tolerant of risk, have more children, 
and have a greater share of housing in their accumulated assets are less likely to 
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tolerant choose private individual retirement accounts over a publicly 
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I. Introduction  
Currently, only a small minority of the world’s population is covered by formal pension systems 
(Holtzman, Packard, Cuesta, 2000). However, with continuing urbanization and the consequent, 
likely demise of traditional family- and community-based systems of social support, formal 
pensions are set to become increasingly important. This being the case, there is growing pressure 
on policy makers to improve the performance of existing pension systems so as to ensure that 
they fulfill their purpose. 
Against this backdrop we pose the following question: When people are free to choose whether 
and how they secure their wellbeing in old age, do they make predictable and rational decisions 
that are consistent with the objective of reducing vulnerability to poverty? The answer to this 
question has implications not only for how paternalistic governments should be with respect to 
pension provision, but also for how they should go about collecting the information required to 
support good pension system design and reform. If people are making predictable and rational 
decisions with respect to the pension system when they are free to do so, policy-makers should 
take heed of those decisions. This is especially true if a considerable proportion of the population 
enjoys such freedom, because then, if the system is poorly designed and people choose not to 
participate as a result, an opportunity to reduce vulnerability will be missed. Further, even if only 
a small proportion of the population are free to choose, a careful analysis of their behavior will 
provide valuable insights into beliefs and preferences relating to formal social insurance, private 
pensions, and alternative, informal mechanisms for reducing vulnerability in old age. These 
insights may help maximize the welfare enhancing effects of reforms. Such an analysis could 
also reveal whether and how the failures in other markets, such as those for labor and credit, 3
impinge on individuals’ insurance decisions and, thereby, indicate the steps policy makers could 
take to ensure that pension reforms have the desired effect. 
Here, we address this question using a dataset relating to urban- and peri-urban-dwelling 
individuals in Peru. Peru provides us with an interesting opportunity to explore these issues as it 
currently has two national pension systems with very different characteristics running in parallel. 
The first is a government administered system, operated on a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) basis 
with benefits defined according to a final-salary formula. The second is a publicly mandated 
system of privately administered individual accounts. Here, pensions are determined through 
defined contributions and the returns earned from the investment of accumulated savings in the 
capital market. 
Many Peruvians, and their employers on their behalf, are mandated to contribute to a pension 
system, while remaining free to choose between the public and the privately administered 
options. We exploit this choice in our analysis, while also making use of the fact that self 
employed Peruvians are not covered by the mandate and that in the informal sector the mandate 
is frequently ignored. 
The analysis builds on empirical work that used similar data from Santiago, Chile (Barr and 
Packard, 2000a & b, 2002, and Packard, 2002). In Chile, among workers who are free to choose, 
i.e., the self employed, those that contribute to the pension system have a relatively high 
tolerance for risk suggesting that there are alternative strategies for securing well-being in old 
age that are perceived as less risky than the formal pension system. Further analysis revealed that 4
investment in housing was one such alternative. However, since 1981, Chileans have only had 
the option of privately managed individual retirement accounts. The choice between the public 
and private systems offered to Peruvians allows us to examine an additional dimension of 
pension system participation. 
The paper has 6 sections. In section II below, we provide some background information on the 
Peruvian pension system. In section III we derive two sets of testable hypotheses relating to the 
first of our questions and outline our empirical strategy. In section IV we present our data and the 
analysis relating to the first set of hypotheses. Section V contains our results relating to the 
second set of hypotheses. And finally, Section VI concludes by revising both of our questions. 
II. Background
In 1992 the Peruvian government introduced structural reforms to the retirement security system 
for workers in the private sector, which until then had been administered directly by the 
government and financed on a PAYGO basis. The reforms allowed workers to redirect their 
social security contributions into privately managed, individual retirement savings accounts. The
government issued bonds to affiliates who switched to the new private system in recognition of 
their past contributions to the public system. 
Since 1993, every new cohort of employees in Peru has chosen between the down-sized public 
PAYGO regime, and the individual accounts managed by a small number of “dedicated” (that is, 5
specialized, single-service) private fund managers, the Adminstradoras de Fondos de Pensiones
(AFPs). If new workers initially choose the public option they can at any time move to the 
private alternative. However, those who choose private accounts cannot move (or return) to the 
public PAYGO system.
1 By law, employees must affiliate and contribute to one or other 
systems, while the self employed are free to choose either or to ignore both. 
Also in 1992, the special pension regime for public sector employees was closed to all but a few 
new entrants.
2 So since 1993, most new public sector employees have faced the same pension 
choice as new private sector employees. Public sector employees already affiliated to the special 
regime could if they wished join the new private pension system. The special pension regime for 
the military was unaffected by the 1992 reforms. 
The specialized AFPs manage individuals’ private accounts and invest their accumulated savings 
in tightly regulated portfolios. A portion of all contributions to the AFPs pays for the financial 
services provided by the fund managers and covers the premia for group disability and life 
insurance policies that the AFPs are required to provide for their contributing affiliates. 
Individuals are allowed to choose their fund manager and those who have been with a fund 
manager for a specified period are allowed to switch. Upon retirement, individuals can either 
1 A similar choice is offered in the United Kingdom, Argentina and Colombia (although in Colombia, workers are 
even allowed to alternate their choice every three years).
2 Only judges and magistrates are still legally allowed to enter the special separate pension regime for civil servants. 
However, the generous parameters of the regime are difficult for organized public sector employment groups to 
ignore and numerous groups have managed to secure entry into the regime through the courts. 6
negotiate a gradual draw down of their savings or use the accumulated balance to purchase 
private annuities. 
To help mitigate the risks of a defined contribution system based on relatively volatile 
investment returns from an emerging capital market, AFP affiliates were promised a minimum 
pension guarantee. An affiliate to the AFP system who contributed to a pension system for at 
least 20 years was to receive some specified minimum annuity guaranteed by the government on 
retirement. However, the regulation necessary to implement the minimum benefit was never 
prepared and passed due to cost concerns. 
Since the PAYGO system is only partially funded by affiliates’ contributions, largely subsidized 
by transfers from general government revenue, and represents a contingent liability that is 
difficult to quantify (Kane, 1995), the government is eager for individuals to choose the private 
pension system. The government has made successive changes to the parameters of the two 
systems to this end. At its inception in 1992, an individual’s contribution to the new private 
system was approximately 13.9 percent, while contributions to the PAYGO system were 9 
percent of wages (see Table 1).
3 Further, the retirement age in the private system was 65, while 
that in the public system was 60. Although there was a surge of affiliation to the private system, 
especially among younger, more educated, and higher earning workers (Palacios and 
Whitehouse, 1999), the higher contribution rate to the private system created a disincentive for 
individuals to switch out of the public plan (Kane, 1995). In 1995 the government raised the 
3 Only an approximate contribution rate can be given for the private AFP system, since a portion of the contribution 
rate consists of variable insurance premia and AFP service fees. 7
contribution rate to the PAYGO system to 11 percent, and the retirement age to 65. The 
contribution rate to the PAYGO system was raised again in 1997 to 13 percent, while that to the 
private system was reduced to 11.6 percent. Finally, in 2001, greater recognition was afforded to 
rights acquired under the public system at the time of entry into the private system and a 
minimum guaranteed benefit was provided for private system affiliates aged 55 and above. 
III. Hypotheses and empirical strategy 
The mandate to participate in the formal pension system affects only employees, while leaving 
the self and unemployed free to choose. Further, the wording of the mandate implies that all 
employees are rationed in the sense that they are bound by law to affiliate and contribute a 
proportion of their earnings to one or other part of the formal pension system. However, there are 
many employees working in enterprises that operate outside the reach of the legal system and 
before conducting our analysis, we need to decide whether these, so called, informal sector 
employees are rationed or enjoy the same freedom of choice as the self and unemployed. 
Here, it is important to bear in mind that it is the employer who makes the affiliation and 
contributions to the pension system on behalf of an employee. Thus, while, as both employer and 
employee, the self employed have full freedom of choice, employees are, at least to some extent, 
compromised by the preferences of their (separate) employers. If an employer chooses not to 
affiliate or contribute to the formal pension system on behalf of an employee who wishes to 
affiliate and contribute, that employee has three options: to neither affiliate nor contribute, i.e., 8
act in accordance with the preferences of their employer; to alert the authorities to the illegal 
stance taken by their employer, possibly jeopardizing their job in the process; or to affiliate 
and/or contribute while pretending to be self employed, i.e., while lying about their employment 
status.  
Which of these options dominates is an empirical question, but for the time being we will assume 
that informal sector employees always take the first option. Under this assumption, employees 
are always rationed. They are rationed to participate if their employer acts in accordance with the 
mandate and rationed not to participate if their employer ignores the mandate. We will return to 
the verisimilitude of this assumption below. 
Now, we can derive two pairs of testable hypotheses relating to the question posed above. The 
first pair of hypotheses, our ‘Participation Hypotheses’, relates in part to whether we can address 
the question at all. If only rationed individuals actually participate in the formal pension system, 
while we can predict the behavior of the unrationed, we cannot tell whether that behavior is 
rationally based on their preferences, beliefs, and alternatives. Thus, our Participation 
Hypotheses are:- 
H0:  Individuals who are unrationed never participate in the formal pension system; 
H1:  At least some unrationed individuals participate in the formal pension system. 
In order to test these hypotheses we use data on individuals and look at two outcome variables 
relating to participation in the formal pension system: whether they are affiliated to one or other 
part of the pension system and whether they are contributing. If at least some unrationed 9
individuals are affiliated and contributing we take it as evidence in support of our alternative 
hypothesis. 
If we find that at least some unrationed individuals participate in a pension system and, if a 
sufficient (to support analysis) proportion of our unrationed sample are participants, we can 
move on to our second pair of hypotheses, our ‘Rationality Hypotheses’. These are:- 
H0:  Unrationed individuals are not making predictable and rational decisions about 
participation in the formal pension system; 
H1:  Unrationed individuals are making predictable and rational decisions about 
participation in the formal pension system in the sense that they are consistent 
with their preferences, beliefs, the availability of substitutes, and the objective 
reducing vulnerability to poverty in old age. 
In testing these hypotheses we look at whether a worker is affiliated to one or other part of the 
pension system, whether they are contributing, and whether they are affiliated to the private or 
the public system. Affiliation and contribution are choices for unrationed workers, but only 
outcomes for those who are rationed due to the mandate and the decisions of their employers. 
For the unrationed, affiliation to a pension system is akin to acquiring an option to accrue rights 
or save in order to receive a pension in the future. This option is then exercised when an affiliate 
decides to contribute. It is at this point that current consumption or the accrual of some other 
asset is sacrificed in order that rights to or savings for a formal pension can be accrued. 10 
The public-private choice applies only to those who have chosen or are constrained to participate 
in the formal pension system. Among these no one is rationed by the mandate, although 
employees may, once again, be constrained by the decisions made by their employers. The 
decision about which pension system to affiliate to is a choice between bundles of specified 
contribution rates, expected rates of return, bureaucratic procedures, and perceived risks. At the 
time of the survey, specified contribution rates and expected rates of return were higher in the 
public system, with the latter being considerably higher for public sector employees.
4 Interviews 
with key informants suggested that for the self employed the bureaucratic procedures associated 
with affiliating to the private system might be less onerous, while for public sector employees 
affiliation to the private system would be equally if not more onerous.  
Especially in the absence of a minimum pension guarantee, a defined-contribution system of 
individual accounts places more risk on the individual. Perceptions of the riskiness of the two 
systems might also take account of the rarity of cases in which the Peruvian government has 
reneged on pension promises and rights acquired under the public pension system. On the other 
hand, recent political scandals implicating the Fujimori administration and the political upheaval 
that followed may have lowered confidence in government institutions. Further, governments 
4 If a man earning an average wage contributes 13% of his salary his entire working life to PAYGO, his internal rate 
of return from the system would be 6.3%. If the same man contributes 11.6% of his salary to an individual account, 
out of which he pays 3.6% in fees in accumulation “pay in” phase and 1% in the pay-out phase his internal rate of 
return is 3.4%. The assumptions for this calculation are as follows. The man: starts his career at age 19; has the 
average length of service; mortality multiplier 100%; starting wage equal to 100% of average at that age; 
productivity growth 100% of average, as long as not below minimum wage. We are indebted to Asta Zviniene at the 
World Bank for these calculations.11 
across the region have cut public defined-benefit pensions and misused public pension funds. 
How each of these factors affects public perceptions of the relative riskiness of the two systems 
is an empirical question that we can address with our data. 
Each of the three outcome variables can be represented by a dichotomous, dependent variable in 
a regression analysis. We call these variables: affiliate, which takes the value one for individuals 
who are affiliated to either the public or the private system and zero otherwise; contributes,
which takes the value one for affiliates who are currently contributing and zero for affiliates who 
are not contributing and non-affiliates; and public, which takes the value one for affiliates to the 
public system, zero for affiliates to the private system, and is undefined for non-affiliates. 
In order to test our Rationality Hypotheses, we regress affiliate, contributes, and public on two 
vectors of right-hand side variables. The first vector, xi, contains variables that may capture 
aspects of an individual’s preference set, beliefs, and alternatives but may also capture or affect 
the characteristics of their job. Because they may capture job characteristics, such variables can 
affect participation in the formal pension system regardless of whether a worker is rationed or 
not. The second vector, di, contains variables that capture only an individual’s beliefs and 
preferences, the extent to which they have access to alternative ways of reducing vulnerability in 
old age, and any constraints other than those relating to the labor market that may impact on their 
decision about formal pension system participation. Only unrationed individuals are free to 
choose whether to participate in the formal pension system conditional on the variables in di.12 
If, in each case, we perform regressions for a sample of individuals who are unrationed and find 
coefficients on the variables in di that are significant and have the appropriate signs, it may be 
taken as evidence against our null and in favor of our alternative Rationality Hypothesis. 
However, ending our analysis there could lead to the erroneous rejection of the null hypothesis if 
any of the variables in di are significant because they are either capturing variability in job 
characteristics that is not captured by xi or affected by or simultaneously determined with the 
dependent variables. With longitudinal data one can address such problems of omitted variable 
and endogeneity bias. However, our data is cross-section. Two-stage estimations using 
instrumental variables are an option only if valid and sufficiently strong instrumental variables 
can be found and this proved impossible with our data. 
There is an alternative, albeit less formal, approach to these problems. Suppose that elements of 
di are capturing variability in job characteristics that is not captured by xi and/or are affected by 
or simultaneously determined with the dependent variables. Then, we would expect those 
elements of di to be significant in the regressions not only for a sample of unrationed individuals, 
but also for a sample of rationed individuals. This being the case, we can avoid the erroneous 
rejection of the null if we only reject it when the coefficients on the variables in di are significant 
for an unrationed sample while being insignificant for a rationed sample. Finally, this strategy is 
only valid if we correctly identify who within our sample of individuals is and is not rationed and 
highlights the importance of being cautious when considering the informally employed. 13 
IV. The data and a test of the Participation Hypotheses 
We draw our data from the Peruvian PRIESO (Encuesta sobre Prevision de Riesgos Sociales), a 
combined survey and behavioral experiment.
5 The PRIESO was conducted in May 2002 and 
involved 1002 individuals randomly drawn from the list of Lima-dwelling, working respondents 
to the ENAHO (Encuesta Nacional de Hogares) survey in the third quarter of 2001. At the time 
of the ENAHO survey (July – August 2001), 63 percent of working respondents were employees 
and 37 percent were self employed. 
The PRIESO sample of workers was stratified by affiliation status in order to ensure sufficient 
degrees of freedom for the analysis of pension contributions and choice between the public and 
private systems conditional on affiliation to a system. The sampling proportions for affiliates and 
non-affiliates were 75% and 18% respectively. 
In the following analysis, we use data relating to 965 of the respondents to the PRIESO. The 
remaining 37 passed the retirement age during the eleven months since the ENAHO. An 
additional 46 respondents became unemployed during the same period, but we include them in 
the analysis to see how the lifting of the mandate with entrance into unemployment affects 
participation. We treat them as unrationed throughout. 
5 Behavioral experiments are most commonly conducted in university laboratories with graduate students as 
subjects, as in Poterba (1988), Kotlikoff, Samuelson and Johnson (1988), and Schubert, et al. (1999). Here, the 
experiment is an integral part of the field work designed to generate proxies for the surveyed individuals’ underlying 
preferences relating to risk. 14 
IV. i Survey data
The distribution of the sample of 965 Peruvian workers with respect to employment status and 
sector is presented in Table 2. Sixteen percent of the sample works in the public sector, 53 
percent are employees in the private sector, 26 percent are self-employed, and 5 percent are 
unemployed. 
Table 3 provides information on the personal and economic characteristics of the sample and 
shows how these characteristics vary with employment status and sector. (The corresponding 
standard deviations for each of the continuous variables are presented in Appendix 1.) The mean 
age is just under 37 years; 38 percent are female; 44 percent are married; and the average 
respondent spent 13.6 years in formal education. All of these factors vary significantly with 
employment status and sector. Public sector employees and the self-employed tend to be older 
and are more likely to be married. Public sector employees also tend to be more educated, while 
the self-employed tend to be less educated. Women are overrepresented among the unemployed. 
Average holdings of assets, other than accrued pension rights or savings, are around USD11,000 
although, once again, there is significant variation with employment status and sector; the self 
employed and public sector employees have higher asset holdings. For workers in all sectors, 
housing accounts for a significant proportion of asset holdings and this proportion also varies 
with employment status and sector. The self employed maintain the largest proportion of their 
assets in houses, while private sector employees maintain the smallest. 15 
The mean income from work for the sample is just under USD 24,000. However, this figure is 
heavily influenced by the top income decile, all of whom are self employed. If this top decile is 
removed, the mean falls to USD 2,131. Mean income varies widely with employment status and 
sector with the unemployed earning nothing and the self-employed earning over two times the 
full sample mean. However, these variations are not significant because the means conceal 
considerable variation within sectors. Among private sector employees for example, there is a 
dramatic difference in earnings between those who are formally and informally employed.  
Our proxy for formality is whether the respondent stated that they held an employment contract. 
It is important to bear in mind that this variable is highly subjective: a legally contracted 
employee may not be aware of the contract between their employer and themselves, while an 
employee may state that they have an employment contract while being unaware of whether it 
would be recognized in a court of law. Thus, as a signal of the legal status of an employee’s 
relationship to their employer, responses to this question are likely to be noisy. Of the private 
sector employees in our sample, 39 percent stated that they did not hold a contract. Their 
earnings are less than half the earnings of private sector employees with contracts. 
The households from whence our respondents come vary in size significantly but only 
marginally across sectors. The full sample mean is 5.4 members. The proportion of children 
(under the age of 15) within each household is also fairly stable around the full sample mean of 
0.24, while the proportion of elderly (over the age of 65) varies significantly with employment 
status between 0.02 and 0.05. 16 
Ten percent of our sample gave responses to questions about securing loans that suggested that 
they were credit constrained. We classified a respondent as credit constrained if in the last year 
they either (i) applied for a loan from a formal financial institution, and were rejected; (ii) did not 
apply to a formal financial institution, but asked family and/or friends for a loan, and were 
nonetheless rejected; or (iii) did not apply to a formal financial institution, nor asked friends and 
family for a loan because they did not know how to apply, found it too difficult, or thought they 
would not be successful. The percentage of credit constrained individuals varies considerably 
across sectors with the self and unemployed being the most likely to be constrained. 
Finally, 27 percent of the sample expects to live with their children in old age, although once 
again, there is significant variation across sectors. Public sector employees are considerably less 
likely to hold this expectation. 
IV.ii Experimental data 
To generate a proxy for preferences relating to risk we used a simplified version of a behavioral 
experiment originally implemented in Chile (see Barr and Packard, 2001a & b). This experiment, 
is similar to the laboratory-run experiment of Schubert, Brown, Gysler and Brachinger (1999), 
although in the field we apply a stronger frame in order to aid understanding, and work in our 
respondents’ homes rather than in a laboratory. The respondents were confronted with a gamble 17 
framed first as an investment and then as an insurance decision and, in each case, required to 
reveal their certainty equivalent.  
Examples of the decision cards used by the trained numerators in the field are shown in Figure 2. 
Using the cards, the numerators asked the respondents to imagine themselves as investors 
choosing whether to invest in Firm A, whose profits were determined by its chances of success 
or failure, or Firm B, whose profits were fixed and secure. The numerators explained the 
probabilities of Firm A’s success and failure linking them to the roll of a die, the pay-offs from 
Firm A in each state, and the fixed pay-off from Firm B.
6 The respondents were then asked to 
decide in which firm to invest. After registering their answer, the numerators would raise the 
amount of the pay-off from Firm B, and ask the respondents to choose between the two firms 
again. They ran several repetitions of this exercise raising the pay-off from Firm B each time. As 
the pay-off from Firm B increases, investing in Firm A looks less attractive to a risk or loss 
averse respondent and at some point they are likely to switch from investing in A to investing in 
B. The pay-off from Firm B at which they switch reveals the value of the respondent’s certainty 
equivalent to the gamble represented by Firm A. 
The insurance gamble was similarly presented. Respondents were asked to imagine they were the 
owners of a good that they could sell at any time, but that there was a possibility that the good 
could be damaged decreasing its market value by a certain amount. The likelihood that damage 
6 The pay-off for Firm A if successful was S/.20 (twenty Peruvian Soles). At the time of the survey, this represented 
twice the average respondent’s hourly income of S/. 10 Soles, or US$3.00 given the prevailing exchange rate of S/. 
3.36 : US$1. 18 
would occur depended on the roll of a die. Respondents could choose to either purchase an 
insurance policy that would protect the value of their good, or not to take up the policy and 
accept the loss were the damage to occur. After registering their decision, the numerators would 
slightly reduce the cost of insuring and ask again whether they would insure. As the cost of 
insurance declines, the option to protect the value of the good becomes more attractive to the 
respondent. This time, the cost of insurance at which they switched from not buying to buying 
the insurance reveals the value of the respondent’s certainty equivalent to the gamble. This 
certainty equivalent is equal to the value of the asset minus the highest cost of insurance that the 
respondent would choose to pay. 
Respondents were informed repeatedly, both prior to and after the exercise, that any one of their 
decisions to invest or insure could determine their earnings from the experiment. At the end of 
the interview, the respondent randomly selected one of their decisions by pulling a token from a 
bag. If they had chosen the gamble in the selected decision they rolled the die. Finally, they were 
paid according to their choice and the outcome of the die. 
We could derive risk aversion parameters from the certainty equivalents elicited during the 
experiment to use in our analysis. However, this would require that we make assumptions about 
the shape of the respondents’ utility functions which we are reluctant to do. So, throughout our 
analysis we work with the certainty equivalents. A higher certainty equivalent implies a greater 
tolerance for risk. Figures 3 and 4 show histograms of the certainty equivalents elicited under the 
investment and insurance frames respectively and Figure 5 shows the cumulative distributions. 19 
Around 20 and 30 percent of the sample settled for a certainty equivalent equal to the lowest 
possible return from the gamble in the investment and the insurance frames, respectively. And 
around 60 and 65 percent settled for certainty equivalents below the expected value of the 
gamble (S/. 14) in the investment and insurance frames, respectively. This suggests a tendency to 
towards risk or loss aversion on the part of our respondents, which is reassuring. However, there 
are some disturbing features in our experimental data, especially the strong modes at the lowest 
and highest certainty equivalents, the modes at S/. 10, and seven non-responses under the 
investment frame, all of which suggest that the task comprehension of some respondents may 
have been limited. This will have added to the noise associated with these data points and could 
bias any coefficients on these variables towards insignificance in our regressions.  
A comparison of the cumulative distribution functions in Figure 5 suggests that the certainty 
equivalents elicited under the investment frame tended to be higher. This finding is consistent 
with loss as opposed to pure risk aversion. Figure 6 plots one certainty equivalent against the 
other for each respondent. It suggests that the two certainty equivalents are highly correlated. 
However, the points that are farther away from this diagonal, especially those along the two axes, 
give further cause for concern. 
Returning to Table 3 we see that the mean certainty equivalents for our sample are 11.6 and 12.7 
for the insurance and investment frames respectively. The certainty equivalents elicited under 
each of the frames vary significantly with employment status. In particular, the unemployed are 
more risk or loss averse according to both measures. Note that the self employed are not 
significantly different from employees with respect to their attitudes towards risk. This finding 
accords with Barr and Packard’s (2001) results for Chile. 20 
IV.iii Pension system participation 
Table 3 also presents information relating to involvement in the formal pension system and 
shows how involvement varies with employment status and sector. Recall that our sample is 
stratified according to whether individuals are affiliated to the formal pension system and that the 
sampling proportion for affiliates is significantly greater than that for non-affiliates (75% and 
18% respectively). With this in mind, in Table 3 we present proportions of affiliates and 
contributors first for the sample and then adjusted to take account of the over-sampling of 
affiliates. 
Looking first at the sample proportions, in total, 70 percent are affiliated and 52 percent are 
contributing to either the public or the private pension system. All the public sector employees 
are affiliated and currently contributing. Within the private sector, 74 percent of employees are 
affiliated and 60 percent are currently contributing. As we expected, both affiliation and 
contribution are highly correlated with whether an employee has a contract. Of those who stated 
that they have a contract, 94 percent are affiliated and 87 percent are contributing. Of those who 
stated that they do not have a contract, only 43 percent are affiliated and 19 percent are 
contributing. Only 45 percent of the self-employed are affiliated and only 11 percent are 
currently contributing. Among the unemployed, 57 percent are affiliated, while only 11 percent 
are currently contributing. 21 
Turning to the adjusted or inferred population proportions, 36 percent of workers are affiliated 
and 26 percent are contributing to either the public or the private pension system. Nothing 
changes with respect to the public sector employees. Within the private sector, 41 percent of 
employees are affiliated and 33 percent are currently contributing, while only 17 percent, of the 
self-employed are affiliated and a very low 4 percent are currently contributing. Among the 
unemployed, 24 percent are affiliated and 5 percent are currently contributing. 
Focusing now on affiliates only (no adjustments required), 36 percent are affiliated to the public 
system. It is the self employed who are most likely to be affiliated to the public system, possibly 
because of the time at which they affiliated: on average the self employed have been involved in 
the pension system longer than the individuals in any other sector. Average elapsed time since 
initial affiliation is around 180 months (15 years) and variations across sectors roughly reflect 
variations in age. The mean numbers of contributing months since affiliation is around 140 and, 
once again, variations across sectors roughly reflect variations in age. However, if we divide the 
number of contributing months by months of affiliation to get a measure of contribution density 
since affiliation, a different and potentially more informative pattern emerges. Then we see that, 
while public and private sector employees have contribution densities of 91 percent and 77 
percent respectively, the self and unemployed have significantly lower contribution densities of 
50 percent and 52 percent respectively.
7
7 Note that, here, we are looking at how the history of participation varies with current employment status and 
sector. We are taking no account of employment history. 22 
Participation in the formal pension system is significantly and dramatically lower among those 
workers who are not rationed by the mandate. This notwithstanding, some, albeit a small 
proportion, of unrationed individuals are participating in the formal pension system and so we 
can reject our null hypothesis, that unrationed individuals do not participate in the formal 
pension system, in favor of the alternative, that at least some do participate. Further, partly due to 
our sampling strategy, the proportion of unrationed individuals in our sample who are 
participating is sufficiently large that we may address our second set of hypotheses. 
IV.iv Applying the data to the Rationality Hypotheses 
Before proceeding to our regression analyses of affiliations, contributions, and the choice of 
public or private system, we need to distribute the variables described above between the vectors 
xi and di being careful to ensure that the vector di is limited to those variables that are likely to 
affect the participation of unrationed workers only. 
In the regressions that take either affiliate or public as their dependent variable, the vector xi
contains the five personal characteristics: a dummy variable that takes the value one for female
respondents and zero otherwise; the age of the respondent in years; their years of formal 
education; a dummy variable that takes the value one if they are married and zero otherwise; and 
a dummy variable that takes the value one if they live in a peri-urban as opposed to an urban 
area. It also contains seven variables relating to the respondent’s current position within the labor 
market. These are dummy variables taking the value one if the respondent is self-employed,23 
unemployed, an uncontracted employee, a public employee, employed in private mining, 
manufacturing, or utilities, employed as a professional in the private sector, employed in the 
private social services sector, employed in the private retail or transport sectors, employed in 
other private sectors, respectively and zero otherwise.
8 Also in vector xi are the respondents’ 
income from employment, the value of their accumulated assets other than those relating to their 
pension, and the size of the household within which they live. Each of these three may impact on 
pension system participation directly: income determines the budget constraint prevailing in any 
particular period; wealth affects the respondents’ ability to smooth short-term consumption while 
continuing to save for the longer term by accruing a highly illiquid asset; and household size may 
capture current consumption needs. However, they might also affect labor market position. 
In the regressions that take contributes as their dependent variable the vector xi includes two 
additional variables. First, public is included to control for any variations in enforcement across 
the two systems. Second, the density of contributions is included as a summary of the 
individual’s history of pension system participation that may control for some of the otherwise 
unobservable heterogeneity in labor market position and related variation in pension system 
enforcement. 
In the regressions that take affiliate as their dependent variable the vector di contains seven 
elements. Following Packard (2002), to capture the workers’ involvement in substitute strategies 
for reducing vulnerability in old age, we include the proportion of their assets, other than their 
8 For certain sub-samples, some of these dummies do not vary or are perfectly collinear. Where this is the case, they 
are omitted from the regressions. We do not report the coefficients relating to the last four of these dummy variables. 24 
accumulated pension rights, that is held in the form of houses. The proportion of children and the 
proportion of elderly in their household could be viewed as proxies for involvement in informal 
income smoothing arrangements. However, these proportions might more conservatively be seen 
as controlling for variations in other household income and other demands on income such as the 
cost of schooling and health care. Whichever view is taken, only the unrationed will be free to 
take account of these factors when deciding whether and how to participate in the formal pension 
system. We also include a dummy variable fsecure which takes the value one if the worker 
expects to live with his or her children in old age and zero otherwise as an additional proxy for 
informal income smoothing arrangements. 
To capture the potential impact of imperfect market functioning elsewhere in the financial sector, 
we include credit, a dummy variable that takes the value one if a worker is credit constrained and 
zero otherwise. Credit-constrained individuals may prefer not to accumulate illiquid assets such 
as formal pension rights. However, only unrationed workers will be able to exercise this 
preference. 
To proxy for an individual’s perceived need for an income after retirement we include the age at 
which the individual expects to die. And to proxy for preferences relating to risk we use the 
experimentally derived certainty equivalent relating to the insurance decision, ceins.
In the regressions that take contributes as their dependent variable the vector di includes two 
additional variables. The first of these is a dummy variable that takes the value one for 
respondents who are receiving a pension. If this pension relates to a disability, an individual may 25 
choose not to contribute as it could alert the authorities to the fact that they are now working 
again. However, only unrationed individuals would be free to take this precaution. The second 
variable is accrued, the total number of months in which the worker has made a contribution to 
their pension system. If pension rights are subject to the law of diminishing marginal returns, 
unrationed individuals will be less likely to contribute the greater their accrued pension rights or 
savings.
9
In the regressions that take public as their dependent variable vector di differs from that used in 
the analysis of affiliate in two ways. First, attitudes towards risk are captured using ceinv rather 
than ceins. The former performs better in the analysis of affilitation and contribution, while the 
latter performs better in the analysis of sector choice. If we view the affiliation and contribution 
decisions as insurance decisions and the sector choice as an investment decision made only after 
the insurance decision has been made, the relative performances of the two risk preference 
measures indicates that the decision frames had externally valid effects on the respondent’s 
decision making.  
Second, three extra variables are added. aflmonths, the number of months that the individual has 
been affiliated to a pension system, and pre’93, a dummy variable that takes the value one if the 
individual affiliated prior to the creation of the private system in 1993, jointly control for any 
inertia on the part of individuals to transfer out of the public system. And pension (defined 
9 In Chile, Packard (2002) found that, ceteris paribus, the likelihood of an individual contributing declined 
significantly once he or she had reached the eligibility threshold for minimum pension guarantee. In Peru, there is no 
minimum pension guarantee at the time of the PRIESO survey. 26 
above) is included because all the pensions being received by individuals in our sample are likely 
to be from the public system and relate to disability or retrenchment. In the case of the former, an 
individual who is either rationed or wishes to contribute may be able to conceal his or her return 
to work by affiliating and contributing to the private system, while retaining their public 
affiliation for the purpose of drawing their pension. In the case of retrenchment, the right to the 
pension can be retained following a return to work and the administrative burden associated with 
being affiliated to two systems may act as a disincentive to private affiliation. Which of these 
effects dominates is an empirical question.  
V. Econometric results 
Table 4 presents the regressions that take affiliate as their dependent variable. In every case we 
use a Probit model and report the marginal effect evaluated at the mean of each continuous right 
hand side variable and the effect of a discrete change from zero to one of each dichotomous 
variable on the probability of being affiliated. All of the public sector employees in our sample 
are affiliated to a pension system, so they have been omitted from the analysis leaving us 809 
observations (see the regression for the full sample in the first column of Table 4). 
Many of the variables included in the vector xi are significant in the regression for the full 
sample. The self and unemployed are significantly less likely to be affiliated and so too are those 
employees who do not have formal contracts. Further, even after controlling for employment 
status and sector, females, the young, the less educated, the unmarried, those in peri-urban as 
opposed to urban areas, those with lower incomes, and those from larger households are less 27 
likely to be affiliated. Some of these effects loose significance when we split the sample, but the 
overall results remain fairly consistent. 
Of the seven variables in vector di only one is significant in the regression for the full sample: 
credit constrained workers are less likely to be affiliated. However, if we restrict our sample to 
the self and unemployed (second column) two additional variables, the proportion of children in 
the household, and the risk preference variable gain significance. Those with more children and 
those who are more tolerant of risk or loss are less likely to be affiliated. 
In contrast, if we restrict our sample to employees only (third column) none of the variables in 
vector diare significant. Note, however that the negative coefficient on ‘uncontracted’ remains 
large and highly significant. 
Table 5 presents the results relating to the regressions that take contributes as their dependent 
variable. Once again we use a Probit model and report marginal and discrete effects for 
continuous and dichotomous variables respectively. All of the public sector employees in our 
sample contribute, so they have been omitted from the analysis. We have also omitted all non-
affiliates, as they, by definition cannot contribute. So, we are left with 519 observations. (See the 
regression for the full sample in the first column of Table 5.) The full sample indicates that the 
self-employed, unemployed and uncontracted employees are all significantly less likely to be 
contributing than contracted employees. Contribution density has a positive and highly 
significant coefficient in all the regressions. Among the self and unemployed, affiliates to the 
public system are significantly less likely to be contributing, suggesting either that it is easier to 28 
evade in the public system, possibly because employees of the AFPs exert greater effort than 
bureaucrats when collecting and chasing up late contributions, or that the desire to evade the 
public system is greater. Income has a positive and significant effect only for the full sample and 
the self and unemployed. 
Of the nine variables in vector di both the proportion of asset holdings invested in housing, and 
the proportion of children in the household assume negative and significant coefficients for the 
self and unemployed only. In contrast and contrary to our initial assumptions, accrued pension 
rights or savings have a negative impact on current contributions for employees. To further 
explore this result we change the way in which we divide the sample, grouping uncontracted 
employees with the self and unemployed and leaving contracted employees separate (see 
columns 4 and 5 of Table 5). This adjustment having been made, both the proportion of children 
in the household and accrued pension rights have a negative impact on the contributions of the 
self and unemployed and uncontracted employees, while none of the variables in di affect the 
decisions of employees with contracts. This suggests that the impact of an employer’s decision 
on the participation of an employee is greatest at the point of affiliation. Once an uncontracted 
employee is affiliated, regardless of whether this accords with their current employer’s decision, 
they have at least some freedom to choose whether to contribute. 
Table 6 presents the results relating to the regressions that take affiliation to the public system, 
public as their dependent variable. Once again we use a Probit model and report marginal and 
discrete effects for continuous and dichotomous variables respectively. Public sector employees 
are included here, but we have omitted all non-affiliates regardless of sector of employment. This 29 
leaves us with 679 observations (see the regression for the full sample in the first column of 
Table 6), although 7 more of these are dropped when we split the sample, as self and 
unemployed drawers of pensions are always in the public system. 
Focusing, first, on the regression for the full sample, we see that the self-employed, uncontracted 
employees and public sector employees are more likely to be affiliated to the public system. 
Older, less educated and less urbanized workers are also more likely to be in the public system. 
In addition, those who affiliated to the public system prior to the creation of the private 
alternative in 1993 are likely to have remained in that system and those who are more tolerant of 
risk are more likely to be affiliated to the public system, although these last two results apply 
only to the unrationed once we split the sample. For the unrationed sample only, those with more 
children are less likely to affiliate to the public system. 
VI. Conclusion 
The primary objective of this paper was to provide an answer to the question – when people are 
free to choose whether and how they secure an income in old age, do they make predictable and 
rational decisions and are these decisions consistent with the objective of reducing vulnerability 
to poverty? 
The ENAHO survey indicates that a substantial share of the working population in Lima are free 
to choose whether to participate in the formal pension system, while our findings indicate that, of 30 
these, a small proportion do indeed participate. Our findings also suggest that we can, albeit 
imperfectly, predict who, among those who are free to choose, participate as well as how they 
participate. Further, and more importantly, there is evidence that their decisions are both rational 
and consistent with the objective of reducing vulnerability in old age. First, among the fully 
unrationed self and unemployed, it is the less risk tolerant who are affiliated to the formal 
pension system. This is rational as long as the formal pension system is a functional and safe 
solution to the problem of vulnerability in old age. Second, those who are credit constrained are 
less likely to affiliate suggesting that rational trade-offs are being made between vulnerability in 
the current period and in old age. Third, those with more children are less likely to either affiliate 
or, conditional on affiliation, contribute to the pension system. This is rational and consistent 
with the stated objective if children provide an effective substitute for the accrual of pension 
rights. Fourth, the greater the share of housing in an unrationed individual’s accumulated asset 
holdings the less likely they are to contribute to the pension system. This is rational and 
consistent with the stated objective if investments in housing can provide an alternative source of 
security in old age. And finally, if uncontracted employees are treated as being free to choose, in 
accordance with diminishing marginal returns, the likelihood of contributing in the current 
period declines as accrued pension rights increase. 
That the variables capturing preferences, beliefs, alternatives, and non-labor market constraints 
predict participation only among those who are free to choose and not among the rationed 
provides some assurance against omitted variable and simultaneity bias. However, note that the 
way in which we defined the rationed and unrationed samples ultimately varied between the 
affiliation and contribution analyses. In the case of former, uncontracted employees were treated 31 
as rationed, while in the case of latter, early results prompted us to reclassify them as unrationed. 
Our stated rationale for this switch was that the constraining force of the employer’s decision 
affects affiliations but not necessarily contributions conditional on affiliation. 
That our decision to treat uncontracted employees as rationed was upheld by the data during the 
analysis of affiliations has important implications for policy makers. It suggests that, because the 
mandate is imperfectly enforced and because employers and not employees are the ones who are 
interacting directly with the pension system, there may be individuals who cannot participate in 
the formal pension system even though they would like to do so. Further, in the light of this 
finding, we should characterize the uncontracted employees’ apparent freedom of choice with 
respect to contributions as a freedom to opt out of the system that is not matched by a freedom to 
opt in. This unintended consequence of the mandate may be adding to rather than reducing some 
individual’s vulnerability to poverty in old age. 
In the regressions relating to the choice between the public and private pension systems, the 
variables capturing preferences, beliefs, alternatives, and non-labor market constraints, once 
again, were significant only for the unrationed. This lends further support to the assumption that 
employees’ are constrained by the decisions taken by their employers with respect to pension 
system affiliation. Rather than having prior expectations about the signs on the coefficients 
relating to these variables, we saw this analysis as an opportunity to learn something about the 
way in which Peruvians perceive the two pension systems. We found three significant effects. 
First, those who affiliated to the public system prior to the creation of the private alternative are 
likely to have remained with the public system, suggesting that there is some inertia among 32 
individuals. Second, those with more children are more likely to be affiliated to the private 
system, suggesting that the public system is seen as a better substitute for relying on children for 
security in old age. And third, those who are more risk tolerant are likely to be affiliated to the 
public system, suggesting that in peoples’ minds the real risks associated with saving in private 
accounts with no minimum pension guarantee are outweighed by their distrust in government 
institutions. 
In summary, our analysis shows that policy makers aiming to reform the Peruvian or indeed any 
other formal pension system could gain considerable insight from watching and analyzing the 
decisions of those who are free to choose whether or not to participate in such systems. Focusing 
on Peru specifically, our analysis shows that there considerable room for improvement in the 
current systems. That so few of those who are free to do so choose to participate in the formal 
pension systems suggests that the systems are not ideally designed to serve their needs. Whether 
continuing to rely on offspring for security in old age is a good strategy in a rapidly changing 
world, only time will tell. Further, the security of investments in housing depends greatly on the 
security of property rights and the ease with which houses can be sold as and when required to 
finance consumption. In many areas of Lima, land property rights are poorly defined and the 
market for land and real-estate functions imperfectly as a result. Finally, the partially rationed 
status of the informally employed renders this group particularly vulnerable. 33 
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Figure 1. New affiliates to the public and private branches of Peru’s retirement security 
system, 1992 – 2002 
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Figure 2. Experimental investment and insurance decisions in the PRIESO Survey
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Table 1. Contribution rates to Peru’s public and private pension systems  
(% of earnings) 
 1992  1995  1997 
PAYGO 9.00  11.00  13.00 
AFP 13.91  11.61  11.61 
Civil Service  6.00  6.00  6.00 
Source: ONP












Private sector 763 247 203 313
79.07% 25.60% 21.04% 32.44%
Of which…
 mining, manufacturing, and utilities 185 40 47 98
19.17% 4.15% 4.87% 10.16%
 professionals 96 22 16 58
9.95% 2.28% 1.66% 6.01%
 social sector 6 481 1 4 5
6.63% 0.83% 1.14% 4.66%
 retail and transport 321 152 85 84
33.26% 15.75% 8.81% 8.70%
 other 97 25 44 28
10.05% 2.59% 4.56% 2.90%
Note: All proportions stated as percentages of full sample42 















sectors     
(P-value)#
Number of observations 965 247 46 516 156
Females female 0.38 0.36 0.54 0.36 0.43 0.0560
Age (years) age 36.85 39.67 35.30 34.22 41.54 0.0000
Formal education (years) education 13.62 11.89 13.39 13.40 17.20 0.0000
Married married 0.44 0.51 0.35 0.37 0.58 0.0000
Peri-urban peri-urban 0.06 0.12 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.0004
Income from work ('000 USD) income* 23.78 59.43 0.00 11.84 13.88 0.4123
Has no employment contract uncontracted 0.39
Total assets ('000 USD) assets* 11.28 14.18 10.68 8.92 14.69 0.0988
  proportion in houses  houses 0.35 0.46 0.36 0.29 0.35 0.0224
Number of people in household household* 5.39 5.45 5.96 5.41 5.08 0.1263
  proportion of which - children children 0.24 0.27 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.0672
  proportion of which - elderly elderly 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.0036
Credit constrained credit 0.10 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.0065
Expected age at death die 70.93 69.83 70.98 71.38 71.17 0.3359
Expect to live with children fsecure 0.27 0.28 0.24 0.29 0.17 0.0160
Attitude towards risk (insurance) ceins 11.61 11.93 11.11 11.53 11.54 0.0028
Attitude towards risk (investment) ceinv 12.68 12.80 11.02 12.77 12.70 0.0439
[958] [245] [512] [155]
Affiliated affiliate 0.70 0.45 0.57 0.74 1.00 0.0000
Contributing contributes 0.52 0.11 0.11 0.60 1.00 0.0000
Receiving a pension pension 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.0001
Inferred population proportions…
Number of observations 965 347 56 482 80
Affiliated affiliate 0.36 0.17 0.24 0.41 1.00
Contributing contributes 0.26 0.04 0.05 0.33 1.00
Receiving a pension pension 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.02
Of affiliates…
Number of observations 677 112 26 383 156
Contributing contributes 0.73 0.23 0.19 0.81 1.00 0.0000
Affiliated to the public system public 0.36 0.70 0.38 0.22 0.45 0.0000
Months as an affiliate aflmonths 180.78 259.46 173.19 148.84 205.05 0.0000
[670] [111] [382] [151]
Months as a contributor accrued 140.56 147.31 135.01 120.09 188.35 0.0000
[670] [111] [382] [151]
Contribution density since  density 0.75 0.50 0.52 0.77 0.91 0.0000
affiliation [670] [111] [382] [151]
# the reported p-values relate to the significance of a regression taking the listed variable as the dependent variable and 
   only three dummy variables relating to employment status and sector as right-hand side variables.
* natural log used in regression analysis, one added to income and value of assets prior to taking logs.
Numbers of observations are as reported at top of table section unless stated in square brackets below particular statistic.43 
Table 4: Regression analysis of affiliations 
dF/dx s.e.    dF/dx s.e.    dF/dx s.e.   
xi self-employed -0.7026 0.0459 ***
unemployed -0.4714 0.1387 *** 0.2141 0.2106
uncontracted -0.5481 0.0538 *** -0.3644 0.0451 ***
female -0.2149 0.0403 *** -0.4286 0.0681 *** -0.0791 0.0348 **
age 0.0179 0.0022 *** 0.0243 0.0038 *** 0.0118 0.0021 ***
education 0.0252 0.0043 *** 0.0330 0.0080 *** 0.0187 0.0041 ***
married 0.0806 0.0410 * 0.1181 0.0809 0.0413 0.0380
peri-urban 0.1024 0.0483 * 0.1164 0.1246 0.0793 0.0325 *
income 0.0173 0.0090 * 0.0099 0.0221 0.0121 0.0075
assets 0.0012 0.0070 0.0031 0.0123 -0.0013 0.0068
household -0.0730 0.0378 * -0.1618 0.0746 ** -0.0170 0.0338
di houses -0.0132 0.0634 -0.0924 0.1178 0.0458 0.0631
children -0.0682 0.1005 -0.3999 0.1911 ** 0.0514 0.0942
elderly -0.2369 0.2147 -0.3840 0.4636 -0.1278 0.1760
fsecure -0.0274 0.0386 -0.0320 0.0783 -0.0211 0.0322
credit -0.1011 0.0610 * -0.2109 0.0934 ** -0.0164 0.0515
die -0.0017 0.0017 -0.0044 0.0035 -0.0003 0.0013
ceins -0.0025 0.0045 -0.0283 0.0097 *** 0.0058 0.0039




Notes: Regressions include four private sector of employment dummy variables for which we have not reported dF/dx and 
s.e. For dummy variables, reported dF/dx is for discrete change from 0 to 1. * significant at 10 percent level, ** significant at 5 
percent level,  *** significant at 1 percent level. 
Full sample Self-employed and unemployed Employees44 
Table 5: Regression analysis of contributions 
dF/dx  s.e.   dF/dx  s.e.   dF/dx  s.e.   dF/dx  s.e.   dF/dx  s.e.  
xi self-employed -0.6421 0.0667 ***
unemployed -0.5602 0.1717 *** 0.2410 0.3399 0.2489 0.2757
uncontracted -0.4970 0.0681 *** -0.3381 0.0621 *** 0.2191 0.0906 **
female 0.0375 0.0532 0.0438 0.0830 0.0337 0.0306 -0.0429 0.0870 0.0404 0.0217 *
age 0.0016 0.0040 0.0055 0.0049 0.0002 0.0026 0.0077 0.0052 -0.0021 0.0021
education -0.0001 0.0054 0.0006 0.0075 0.0014 0.0031 -0.0005 0.0077 0.0004 0.0022
married 0.0186 0.0525 -0.0054 0.0744 0.0166 0.0311 0.0154 0.0727 0.0052 0.0241
peri-urban 0.0440 0.0819 -0.0168 0.1210 0.0473 0.0335 0.1079 0.1563 0.0023 0.0454
income 0.0225 0.0122 * 0.0091 0.0227 0.0107 0.0066 * 0.0246 0.0168 0.0028 0.0052
assets 0.0115 0.0097 0.0312 0.0139 ** 0.0004 0.0056 0.0290 0.0149 * -0.0005 0.0038
household -0.0444 0.0494 -0.0041 0.0604 -0.0126 0.0355 -0.0078 0.0666 -0.0326 0.0289
density 0.6685 0.0861 *** 0.6099 0.1864 *** 0.3406 0.0641 *** 1.0700 0.1611 *** 0.1327 0.0443 ***
public -0.1532 0.0629 *** -0.1242 0.0872 -0.0977 0.0511 ** -0.1275 0.0768 * -0.0971 0.0566 **
di houses -0.0084 0.0858 -0.2114 0.1097 * 0.0619 0.0514 -0.1086 0.1219 0.0440 0.0363
children -0.2085 0.1298 -0.4404 0.1756 ** -0.0189 0.0707 -0.3471 0.1972 * -0.0360 0.0468
elderly -0.1772 0.2300 -0.2705 0.3718 -0.0370 0.1183 -0.4535 0.4269 0.0839 0.0961
fsecure 0.0449 0.0487 0.1171 0.0919 -0.0018 0.0321 0.0980 0.0797 0.0119 0.0215
credit -0.0466 0.1051 0.0838 0.1519 -0.0645 0.0755 -0.0645 0.1212 -0.0288 0.0497
die 0.0020 0.0025 0.0026 0.0041 0.0008 0.0014 0.0038 0.0041 0.0005 0.0010
ceins 0.0001 0.0057 0.0077 0.0071 -0.0018 0.0033 0.0097 0.0085 -0.0026 0.0025
pension -0.0605 0.1529 -0.0285 0.1351 -0.0594 0.1086 0.0097 0.1933 -0.0108 0.0551
accrued -0.0007 0.0003 ** -0.0009 0.0005 -0.0004 0.0002 * -0.0018 0.0005 *** 0.0000 0.0001
Obs. 519 137 382 224 269
Pseudo R
2





Contracted           
employees 
Notes: Regressions include four private sector of employment dummy variables for which we have not reported dF/dx and s.e. For dummy 






Table 6: Regression analysis of affiliations to the public pension system 
dF/dx  s.e.   dF/dx  s.e.   dF/dx  s.e.  
xi self-employed 0.5173 0.0556 ***
unemployed 0.2887 0.1902 -0.2498 0.3318
uncontracted 0.3527 0.0642 *** 0.3370 0.0645 ***
public emp. 0.3156 0.0723 *** 0.2796 0.0699 ***
female -0.0339 0.0453 0.2637 0.0869 ** -0.0792 0.0428 *
age 0.0105 0.0036 *** 0.0140 0.0089 0.0091 0.0036 ***
education -0.0201 0.0044 *** -0.0311 0.0128 ** -0.0162 0.0043 ***
married 0.0065 0.0449 -0.1368 0.1024 0.0191 0.0433
peri-urban -0.1435 0.0648 * -0.0929 0.1569 -0.1435 0.0583 *
income -0.0011 0.0142 0.0140 0.0283 -0.0076 0.0154
assets -0.0111 0.0072 -0.0251 0.0164 -0.0057 0.0069
household -0.0232 0.0456 0.0806 0.0940 -0.0356 0.0482
di houses -0.0442 0.0678 0.1420 0.1548 -0.0910 0.0668
children -0.0595 0.1139 -0.6968 0.2791 ** 0.0624 0.1101
elderly -0.0340 0.2069 -0.3187 0.5587 0.0298 0.1917
fsecure 0.0059 0.0494 -0.0334 0.1230 0.0108 0.0480
credit 0.0174 0.0797 0.0256 0.1476 0.0433 0.0881
die -0.0011 0.0021 -0.0029 0.0045 -0.0007 0.0022
ceins 0.0108 0.0051 ** 0.0217 0.0119 * 0.0062 0.0051
aflmonths -1.27e
-5 3.44e
-4 -0.0003 0.0008 0.0001 0.0004
pre'93 0.1552 0.0627 ** 0.2779 0.1682 * 0.0978 0.0631
pension 0.2086 0.1352 0.0480 0.1443




Full sample Self-employed and unemployed Employees
Notes: Regressions include four private sector of employment dummy variables for which we have not reported dF/dx and 
s.e. For dummy variables, reported dF/dx is for discrete change from 0 to 1. * significant at 10 percent level, ** significant at 5 
percent level,  *** significant at 1 percent level. 46 
Appendix 1 
Table A1: Standard deviations of characteristics (continuous variables only) 










Public    
sector 
employees
Age (years) age 11.66 12.18 13.82 11.09 9.36
Formal education (years) education 5.55 5.67 5.62 5.21 4.81
Income from work ('000 USD) income* 386.40 763.18 0.00 18.16 18.19
Total assets ('000 USD) assets* 32.86 35.42 27.96 30.83 36.00
  proportion in houses  houses 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.44 0.45
Number of people in household household* 2.31 2.58 2.35 2.21 2.13
  proportion of which - children children 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.21
  proportion of which - elderly elderly 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.11
Expected age at death die 11.06 11.42 12.07 11.34 9.00
Attitude towards risk (insurance) ceins 4.08 4.24 3.74 4.07 3.87
Attitude towards risk (investment) ceinv 3.90 3.99 3.45 3.91 3.82
Of affiliates…
Months as an affiliate aflmonths 136.37 159.06 163.22 124.16 114.04
Months as a contributor accrued 125.87 146.51 163.22 116.56 112.09
Contribution density since  density 0.34 0.34 0.41 0.33 0.21